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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
GENERAL MILLS, IXC., a C'or-
poration of the State of Del-
aware, doing business under 
the trade name of SPERRY 
FLOUR COMP A~"Y, Western 
Division of General Mills, Inc., 
and ZURICH GENER..lL AC-
CIDENT AND LIABILITY 









PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF 
Defendant Olga Lassen Hansen is the only defend-
ant who has filed a brief herein. Apparently she makes 
four contentions: 
I. 'That the plaintiffs did not withdraw their stip-
ulation that Marius Hansen was injured March 17, 1938 
while in the course of his employment. 
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II. That the employer's reports of injury (Tr. 1 
and 2) and certain letters from plaintiffs' attorneys are 
evidence that Marius Hansen was injured March 17, 
1938 while in the course of employment. 
III. That the testimony of Esther Peterson is 
barred by the provisions of !Section 104-49-2 ( 3), Revised 
Statutes of Utah 1933. 
IV. That plaintiffs could not withdraw from their 
stipulation. 
We shall discuss the propositions in their order. 
I. 
The record answers contention number I in a very 
positive manner. At the first hearing in Ogden June 5, 
1939 on page 4, 1 T. (we have heretofore designated the 
two transcripts of evidence as 1 T. and 2 T.) the follow-
ing occurs: 
'·'Commissioner Knerr: * * * Are you will-
ing to admit that on March 17, 1938 the d~­
ceased herein was injured by reason of an aCCI-
dent arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment while employed by the .Sperry Flour Com-
pany~'' 
"Mr. Olmstead: We will so admit." 
Counsel apparently contend that because the word 
"admit" was used the matter was not a stipulation and 
not so understood by the parties. However, with refer-
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ence to this contention we find (2 T. 25) the following by 
Mr. Olmstead: 
"But in new of what I know now it lwt'Ollll'S 
neeessarv for me to withdraw from that stipula-
tion and" to advise the parties that we are making 
an issue on the question of whether or not Mr. 
Hansen was engaged in-Mr. Hansen was in fact 
injured in the course of his employment. I state 
that into the record at this time so that the other 
parties may be able to meet the issue.'' 
Thereupon the Commission continued the case for 
twenty-four hours. The parties were given definite warn-
ing that the matter was continued for twenty-four hours 
'in order that the parties might meet the issue. Mr. Olm-
stead clearly indicated that the stipulation he was re-
ferring to was the one that he had entered into by his 
admission heretofore set forth. To say that because it 
was -characterized as an admission in one place and a 
stipulation in another it thereby cannot be dassified as 
a stipulation is merely quibbling. Mr. Olmstead clearly 
indicated that he regarded his admission as a ·stipulation 
and that he was withdra"\\-i.ng from it. It makes no dif-
ference what it was characterized. The fact of the mat-
ter is that the plaintiffs notified everyone that they would 
not now eoncede that Mr. Hansen was injured on March 
17th by an aecident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment. The parties were put upon notice of this 
fact. No one objected to it and the Commission per-
mitted withdrawal from the stipulation by ·continuing the 
case to receive the evidence ,controverting it, and on the 
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following day by receiving the evidence that showed the 
admission or stipulation, call it wha·t you will, to be un-
true. 
Before Mr. Olmstead withdrew from the stipulation 
he advised the ·Commission and the parties that he had 
a ·subpne.na for a witness who would testify that Mr. 
Hansen was not in ·the course of his employment but on 
an undertaking of his own at the time of his injury; that 
he was not injured o:n March 17th but on March 20th, 
three days after the date he claims to have been injured. 
(2·T. 23, 24, 25) 
He clearly stated that at the first hearing and up to 
that time plaintiffs had been laho·ring under the impres-
sion that the injury occurred on March 17th in the course 
of Mr. Hansen's employment ' 1' and at that time it was 
stipu.lated between the parties that Mr. Hansen was in-
jured on that date in the course of his employment", but 
that now it was neeessary to withdraw from that stipula-
tion. The only place in the record where Mr. Olmstead 
agreed that Mr. Hansen was injured on Mareh 17, 1938, 
while in the course of his employment is the admission 
(1 'T. 4), so that it is perfectly obvious and apparent that 
what he was referring to as a ·stipulation was that ad-
mission. 
While the Commissioner did not formally rule that 
the stipulation ·might be withdrawn, he continued the case 
until two o'clock of the following day in order to allow 
the introduction of the evidence showing the stipulation 
to be untrue, and on the following day such evidence was 
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admitted and reeeived. So that the parties had ample 
warning that there was now no evidence in the reeord on 
this vital question, a'nd on the following day they ap-
peared with their attorney, and at that time neither the 
parties nor their attorney made any objeetion to the 
withdrawal from the &tipulation or to the introdudion 
of the evidence showing it to have been improvident. 
In the case of Brink t'. Indu-strial Commission, 15 N. 
E. (2d} 491, cited by us in our original brief, there was 
no formal ruling on the withdrawal of the stipulation, 
but the eourt treated the stipulation as though it had 
been withdrawn because the Commission proceeded to 
hear the evidence exactly as it did in this case. The court 
said: 
"In the light of that affidavit the stipulation was 
improvidently made and should be set aside, since 
it does not appear that to do so would work any 
injusti~ to the defendant.'' 
There can .be nG question that the plaintiffs made an 
issue of the contention and denied that Marius Hansen 
was injured March 17, 1938, by reason of an accident aris-
ing out of or in the course of his employment, presented 
positive evidence to show that he was not so injured, 
whi·ch evidence is all there is in the record on that point. 
II. 
It is obvious from the statement of Mr. Olmstead at 
the last hearing that up to that time everyone had been 
laboring under the impression that Marins Hansen was 
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injured March 17, 1938 while in the course of his employ-
ment. Of cour·se the only way that they could get such 
an impression would be from Mr. Hansen himself, since 
none of them knew of the facts except as related by him. 
Counsel seem to contend, although rather half-heartedly, 
that the employer's reports of the injury and the letters 
from the plaintiffs' attorneys are evidence that Mr. Han-
se:n was injured March 17th while in the course of his 
employment. In the first place there isn't a word in these 
documents that indicates that Mr. Hansen was in the 
course of his employment. Secondly, as already indi-
cated, the employer and his attorrneys were at all times 
until the last hearing, laboring under the misapprehen-
sion as to the facts, which misapprehension was later 
corrected 'by withdrawal from the stipulation, as already 
indicated. Thirdly, neither Mr. Hickman who made the 
first report of irnjury, nor Mr. H·ohl who made the final 
report, could bind the plaintiffs by any statements of 
theirs; and fourthly, none of those documents are evi-
dence. 
Thi·s court said in the case of Roberts v. Industrial 
Commission, 93 Pac. (2d) 494, a very recent case, August 
15,1939: 
"Apparently it was thought that so long as evi-
dence upon that question wa~s on file in the office 
·of the Industrial Commission in the form or re-
ports by Roberts as a hotel proprietor, it was un-
necessary to introduce those reports in evidence; 
that they could be' judicially noticed' and attached 
to the record. If such was the thought it was an 
error. Each re·cord of trial under this law should 
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be kept in and of itself. Each deme·nt ~nect>ssary 
to sustaiH an order by the trib1wal or comm,i.._c:sion 
under this law should be supported by testimony, 
exhibi-ts, or stipuhz.tion introdu<-ed at the hearing. 
The rule i.s ·no di/lerent than that in i·ndu..c:trial 
accidents." (Italics added.). 
Eve-n if the reports and letters were part of the 
record they are not evidence, as we have already pointed 
out. .As a matter of fact this eourt bas squarely held 
that even the payment of compensation does not preclude 
the employer from denying liability later. 
In Taggert v. Industrial Co-mmission of Utah, 79 
Utah 598, 12 Pac. (2d) 356, at page 602 of the Utah 
report·s tbis court said : 
"The applicant contends that the carrier admowl-
edged that Taggert met with an accident and it 
does not lie in its mouth later to deny that Taggert 
met with an accident which caused his death. * 
* * Tbis contention is untenable." 
·Tbis, of course, must be the rule. The employer amd 
the insurance carrier, relying upon the employee's state-
ment, make their reports and pay compensation. Later 
it is discovered that the employee's statements are un-
true. Certainly thB law does not permit him to gain am 
advantage by bis deception. 
There are certain letters and reports of Dr. Root 
relied on in the record. But Dr. Root testified that the 
only information he had was received from Mr. Hansen. 
(2 T. 12, 13) 
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The testimony of Miss Peterson is very significant. 
March 17, 1938 was on a Thursday. On either 'Thursday 
or Friday, :J\Ilarch 17 or 18, 1938, Miss Peterson rode with 
Mr. Hansen from Ce1nterfield tn Richfield. This was 
after the alleged injury of :March 17th which Mr. Hansen 
said occurred as he was proceeding south .of Payson at 
10 :30 A. M. ISo when he saw Miss Peterson it was after 
the time of his alleged accident and she says that she 
didn't notice a1ny di·sability and be did not complain of 
any, nor did be on the following Sunday when she was 
riding wi tb him in the evening on the way to Gunnison, 
and it was not until that occasion when they did have an 
accident and be received a terrible jolt that be complained 
of pain in his stomach. 
He spent that night, Sunday night, (2 T. 29, 30) in 
Gunnison, returni1ng to Ogden the next day. His son 
stated that he saw his father at Ogden the day after the 
accident (1 T. 21), and that it was either Sunday or Mon-
day. (1 T. 27) Obviously it wa,s Monday be-cause, as we 
have seen, Sunday he was in Gunnison. 'This is a very 
material bit of evidence, be,cause the son could only have 
learned of the aecident from his father, so that obviously 
the father bad told him on Monday that the accident bad 
happened the previous day, which is the day testified to 
by Miss Peterson. 
As we have already stated, even had there been evi-
dence of an accident on the 17th there is nothing in the 
record to show that it was that accident, instead of the 
one on the 20th, that was responsi'ble for his injury. The 
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illlference is that it was not sinee he complnhwd of no 
disability until after the aceident of the ~Oth. He did not 
see Dr. Root until Wednesday, March 23rd, at which time 
Dr. Root stated that he was in a serious condition and in 
no condition to drive an automo·bile. He was not in this 
condition prior to the accident of March 20th. 
III. 
Counsel contend that under the provisions of 104-49-
2 (3), Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, the testimony of 
Miss Peterson was incompetent. This provision of the 
statute has absolutely no application whatever to this 
case. Miss Peterson is not a party to the controversy, 
is not interested therein, and is not claiming anything 
from anyone. 
IV. 
We have examined the cases cited by the defendant. 
Many of them sustailll the very point that we are arguing 
for, namely, that the Commission had a discretionary 
power to permit the withdrawal of the stipulation. Others 
are not in P?int at all Either no application for with-
drawal was made, or made for the first time on appeal. 
Still others simply do not contailll the language quoted 
as coming therefrom. 
Counsel say that because they were present for the 
fir,st time at the last hearing they could have had no 
knowledge of the previous state of the record. There was 
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only one reason for the continua1nce of the case and that 
was for the reception and admission of the testimony of 
the plaintiffs controverting the conte;ntion that Marins 
Hansen was injured in the course of his employment 
March 17, 1938. That was why the hearing wa,s continued 
until the followi•ng day. Up to that time the applicants 
had not been represented by counsel. But when the hear-
ing was continued f.or the above stated purpose they ap-
peared with counsel. It must be perfectly obvious that 
the reason counsel was employed was to meet the changed 
conditions. Else why employ counsel at that stage of the 
proceedings~ If counsel's clients failed to appraise them 
of the situation that cannot change the record. In fact 
counsel almost concede that their arguments are not very 
meritorious. On page 14 .of their brief they say: 
''If the contention of the plaintiffs, that the Com-
mis·sion had to permit the withdrawal of their 
stipulation, be accepted hy this court as the law, 
then this court should return the whole matter to 
the Industrial Commission for an entire rehear-
ing.'' 
Here counsel not only recog.nize that our so-called 
admis,sion was a stipulation but that the withdrawal of 
the stipulation withdrew all evidence from which the 
Commission ;could make a :finding. Of course, we all 
know that all this court can do is either affirm or set 
aside the order of the Commission. Counsel likewise 
contend that •no real reason was given to justify the with-
drawal of the ,stipulation. The best reason in the world 
was that it was untrue, and this was clearly pointed out. 
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The contention is nlso madL' that bet•nthw wl' paid ('Olll-
pensation without objeetion we admitted our liability. 'r c.> 
have also answered this contention. 
There is absolutely no e\-idL'nep in tlw record to sus-
tain the finding of the Commission that Marius Ha~nseu 
was injured March 1 j, Hl3S, or nny other time, by an 
accident arising out of or in the rourse of his employ-
ment. The award of the Commission should be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEYIXE, HoWELL & SnxE AND 
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD, 
SHIRLEY P. Jo:~ms, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
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